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APPEALING A REJECTION AT THE PATENT BOARD OF APPEALS:
ANALYSIS OF RECENT BOARD DECISIONS AND NON-APPEAL ALTERNATIVES
BY: SUSAN PERNG PAN*
ABSTRACT
This article discusses the merits of appealing rejections to the Board of Patent Appeals in
comparison to continued ex parte prosecution before the Examiner. The analysis takes into
account recent decisions rendered by several patent panels and recent precedent of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Recommendations are offered to place claims in better
condition for appeal and for the types of arguments to be made, as well as to guard against
potential pitfalls during prosecution.
I. TIMING FOR APPEAL
{1} The timelines for Appeal and ex parte prosecution become intertwined, because the U.S.
patent statute permits appeal of a rejection in the following circumstances: “[a]n applicant for
a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the
primary examiner to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, having once paid the fee for
such appeal.”1
{2} In implementing the statute, the patent office regulations permit an Applicant to appeal a
rejection in an application for original patent after receiving either a final rejection or two nonfinal rejections.2 It is not necessary that all claims be twice rejected, and it is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the Board if any claim in the application satisfies this requirement.3 It is also not
necessary that the rejection occur during prosecution of a single application. It is sufficient if
one claim is rejected both in a prior application and in a continuing application.4
{3} The patent regulations thus permit Applicants the opportunity to obtain a final disposition of
the patentability of their patent claims by appealing the Examiner’s rejections prior to reaching
a “final” impasse with the Examiner. Because an Applicant has the choice to continue ex parte
prosecution or pursue the appeal route, the decision should take into account the strength of the
claims and arguments in view of the cited art and whether the claims are in their best possible
form prior to entering the appeal process.
II. TO AMEND OR TO APPEAL: THE FESTO FACTOR
{4} Given the options of (1) appealing a final rejection or a second non-final rejection, or (2)
pursuing prosecution on the merits by the filing of an amendment or response, an Applicant
would be well-advised to press matters for patentability of the originally-filed claims as far as
possible before the Examiner. The 2002 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.5 emphasizes the importance of appealing a
rejection that an Applicant views as patently incorrect as opposed to amending the claims in
a response to an office action.6 “While the patentee has the right to appeal, his decision to
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forgo an appeal and submit an amended claim is taken as a concession that the invention as
patented does not reach as far as the original claim.”7 When a claim is amended and narrowed,
whether for the purpose of complying with a prior art rejection under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103, or
for the purpose of clarifying the claim meaning under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the patentee is regarded
as “having conceded an inability to claim the broader subject matter or at least as having
abandoned his right to appeal a rejection. In either case estoppel may apply.”8 The Supreme
Court establishes amendment and appeal as opposite paths to be taken. The Court views
abandonment of the right to appeal, i.e. amending the claims, as a strong concession. As a result
of Festo, Applicants who amend claims without any explanation do so at their peril. “[W]hen
the court is unable to determine the purpose underlying a narrowing amendment – and hence a
rationale for limiting the estoppel to the surrender of particular equivalents [under the doctrine
of equivalents] – the court should presume that the patentee surrendered all subject matter
between the broader and the narrower language.”9
{5} The Festo decision equates amendment with a surrender of the right to appeal, and
demonstrates that a presumption of estoppel or surrender of equivalents arises from such
amendment. This suggests that if the rejection of a broad independent claim is appealed,
rather than amended, estoppel may not apply. Alternatively, a less stringent estoppel may apply
even if the claim is ultimately deemed unpatentable on appeal because the Applicant has not
acquiesced to the Examiner’s rejection. In view of the Supreme Court precedent, during ex parte
practice, an Applicant who can make a colorable argument of patentability over prior art without
amending the claims should proceed to make such arguments. This approach should be taken
even though amendatory material would strengthen the arguments. Such an Applicant will
neither be presumed to have acquiesced in the rejection, nor to have surrendered a wide swath
of equivalents between the original and amended claim. As a safeguard, amendatory material
can be placed in a separate dependent claim to test whether the amendatory material would be
deemed to describe allowable subject matter.
{6} Aside from the issue of scope of equivalents addressed by the Supreme Court, the Federal
Circuit case law on dedication also suggests that narrowing claim amendments are a form of
conscious waiver.
The patentee has control over the drafting of the claims, and if he discloses but
omits to claim certain subject matter, he will be held to have waived the right
to capture the disclosed matter under the doctrine of equivalents, and to have
dedicated it to the public. No such waiver occurs where, as in Graver Tank II, the
patentee actually claimed the subject matter, even if the particular claims are later
held invalid. There is, moreover, in such circumstances far less possibility that the
patentee is “gaming” the system, that is, deliberately writing narrow claims with the
objective of avoiding a searching PTO examination and recapturing the disclosed
subject matter through the doctrine of equivalents.10
In view of the negative consequences of a failure to argue patentability to the fullest extent,
and recognizing the pitfalls of dedication if broad claims are amended to exclude particular
embodiments, it behooves an Applicant to strenuously fight any patentability rejections without
amendment, if possible.
III. EVALUATING WHETHER TO APPEAL A REJECTION
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{7} Over the course of ex parte prosecution, the Applicant should continually evaluate the strength
of the Examiner’s rejection, considering not only the technical points underlying the rejection,
but also the procedure applied in making the rejection and the rationale used to maintain any
rejections. This evaluation will result in a better-informed decision concerning whether an appeal
should be pursued.
{8} In the event of a second non-final rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102, addressing novelty, or under
35 U.S.C. § 103, addressing obviousness, it is beneficial to respond to either rejection under 37
C.F.R. § 1.111. In view of such non-finality, § 1.111 gives the Applicant the opportunity to obtain
allowance of the claims in a timely manner without incurring the expense and time delays of an
appeal.11 The most recent available figures from the U.S. Patent Office indicate that the Board
of Patent Appeals is currently deciding appeals filed up to three years ago.12 The opportunity to
respond again under § 1.111 also affords the opportunity to develop the record further, which
leads to either of two possible benefits.
{9} A first possible benefit is that the Examiner will accept the arguments in the response as being
sufficiently persuasive to place at least some of the claims in condition for allowance. At that
juncture, the Applicant has the additional option of amending the claims to obtain allowance of
some claims and filing a separate continuation application for any claims that remain rejected.
{10} A second possible benefit is that the Examiner, even while rejecting the arguments
in the response as unpersuasive, will helpfully expand upon the rationale as to the lack of
persuasiveness in a subsequent non-final or final rejection. The value of this second possibility
necessarily relies on the nature of the response filed by the Applicant. This fact makes it very
important to exercise precision in formulating the response, rather than stating generalities.
General denials submitted by the Applicant merely beget general denials from the Examiner,
which is not helpful towards advancing a dialog with the Examiner, obtaining the patent or
developing the record for appeal. For these reasons, an Applicant should respond to a final
rejection under 37 C.F.R. § 1.116 by using the same strategy. In particular, for any response
to arguments made by the Examiner, the Applicant should assess the underlying rationale and
explain any weaknesses or inconsistencies in the Examiner’s position.
{11} Arguments directed towards patentability over prior art fall generally into two broad
categories: technical and legal. Both types of arguments should be developed in responses filed
under 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.111 and 1.116 prior to entering the appeal stage.
A. Analysis of Recent Decisions
{12} The decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, dating from appeals filed
during Fiscal Year 1993, are available through the U.S.P.T.O. website at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/sol/foia/index.html. The database is searchable, through somewhat limited
search constraints, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/search.html. A random sample of the
decisions indicates that legal and technical arguments are equally effective in reversing Examiner
rejections.13
{13} A review of a number of recent Board Decisions reveals several analyses that are noteworthy.
These particular decisions offer some insight into “claim construction” approaches that
various panels have taken, comparing and contrasting effective arguments based on technical
distinctions and legal arguments. Most, if not all, of the decisions posted to the website, and all
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of those discussed below, are identified as “nonprecedential” decisions that are not binding on the
Board. If any weight is given to such decisions, the weight is severely limited.14 However, in certain
circumstances, the Federal Circuit, which reviews appeal decisions of the Board, will give some
weight to decisions designated as nonprecedential.15 For purposes of fashioning or evaluating
arguments for appeal, a brief discussion of selected decisions follows.
1. Claim Interpretation of Rejected Claims
{14} In analyzing prior art rejections, Board decisions that address claim interpretation rely upon
two seemingly opposite lines of legal precedent. Recent panels, following the mandate of the
Supreme Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,16 resort to Applicant’s disclosure for
purposes of interpreting the claims.17 This appears to be contrary to the concept that, during
prosecution, the claims are to be given their broadest reasonable meaning, and that the scope of
the claim cannot be narrowed by reading disclosed limitations into the claim.18 Several decisions
of the Board do in fact resort to the specification and drawings for the purpose of understanding
the scope of a rejected claim.
{15} Even though the panels have turned to the specification to interpret claims on appeal, any
Applicant deciding whether to pursue an appeal based on existing claim language, or whether to
continue prosecution by one of several non-appeal alternatives discussed below, should consider
whether its particular arguments can be supported by the context and broad concepts of the
pending claim recitations. In such a case, it is possible that the broad concepts of the claim can
be argued on appeal without modifying the claim language to specifically include the limitations
in the specification. However, if the arguments must rely on actual limitations discussed in
the specification but are unclaimed, then the Applicant is better advised to amend the claim to
describe the invention more specifically.
a. Conceptual Distinctions Based On Context
{16} In Ex parte Schmidt, the claim in question was recited as follows:
An extended field-of-view mirror, the mirror comprising: (a) a convex reflective
surface having a viewing area and a continuous perimetral edge surrounding the
viewing area: (b) an opaque band integrally formed with the reflective surface
and depending therefrom, the opaque band substantially surrounding the entire
reflective surface; and (c) a mounting flange integrally formed with the opaque band
and extending outwardly therefrom.19
{17} A central issue in the appeal was how to define the broad recitation “integrally formed with.”
The Board recognized that the specification provided no definition of the term, but turned to figure
four of the application to determine that, in the context of claim one, “integrally formed with”
meant that the mirror parts were joined together prior to any use of the mirror.20 In essence, the
mirror included each of the cited components prior to its being secured to a mounting frame.21
In reversing the rejection, the Board noted that the cited art did not include the claim elements
“integrally formed with,” since a separate elastic ring was part of the disclosed structure only after
being put into an interlocking relationship with a frame. The cited ring was thus “separate” and
not integrally formed with the mirror prior to any use.22
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{18} The decision and definition of the phrase “integrally formed with” in Ex parte Schmidt
appears to have put significant weight on the context established by the claim preamble.23 In
particular, the item in question was “a mirror” that included several elements “integrally formed
with” other elements. It is conceivable that a different outcome would have resulted on appeal if
the claim recited a “mirror assembly” rather than just a “mirror.”24
{19} The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences again resorted to the Applicant’s
specification for claim construction purposes in Ex parte Rahman.25 While acknowledging that
claims should be given their broadest reasonable interpretation during prosecution, the Board
further indicated that the terms in the claim should be construed as those skilled in the art would
construe the claim.26
{20} In Rahman, the claim in question recited: “A method for controlling traffic comprising:
developing global positioning system information about a plurality of vehicles; analyzing traffic
patterns based on said information; developing traffic control signals based on said traffic
patterns; and transmitting said traffic control signals to traffic control devices.”27 Based on
descriptions in the specification, the Board construed “traffic control devices” to comprise devices
such as speed limit signs, traffic metering lights, traffic signs and traffic signals.28 However, the
Board considered that the transmission of traffic information to a vehicle was not a transmission
of traffic control signals to “a traffic control device” and rejected the claim.29
{21} Under its broadest construction, the term “traffic control device” may comprise any device
that would have an impact on traffic. It is not inconceivable that a controller in a vehicle would
have some impact on traffic flows. Yet, in reversing the rejection, the Board’s analysis appears to
import definitional aspects of the term “a traffic control device” into the claims to limit the phrase
to those listed in the specification. Obviously, given the Federal Circuit’s directive in In re Morris 30
and In re Hiniker Co.,31 which emphasizes the importance of claim language rather than resorting
to the specifications, an Applicant cannot be assured that the Board will use the specification so
liberally in the appeal of any given case. However, the context of the claim recitation in Ex parte
Rahman also suggests that “vehicles” recited in the first element of the appealed claim are being
distinguished from “traffic control devices” recited in the last element. Therefore, apart from
the definitions imparted by the specification, the claims themselves would appear to warrant
the construction afforded by the Board that a “traffic control device” is distinguishable from a
“vehicle.”
2. Patentability of Invention Based on Achieved Effects Over Prior Art
{22} In some decisions reviewed for the preparation of this article, the Board did not specifically
rely on the definition of a claim term in deciding the case. Rather, the rationale underlying
reversals of the appealed rejections were cast in terms of the Applicant’s discovery and solution
of a new problem. In Ex parte Nella, the rejected claim recited:
A target detection, seeking and guidance system for an air-to-air, air-to-ground and/
or ground-to-air missile comprising a hyperspectral imaging system for detecting
a target having a predetermined hyperspectral signature; means for enabling the
missile to track the target matching the predetermined hyperspectral signature;
and means including a missile controller for guiding the flight path of the missile to
intercept the flight path of the target matching said predetermined hyperspectral
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signature.32
{23} The primary reference was directed generally towards missile guidance systems without
specifically indicating that the targets were tracked by a hyperspectral signature.33 Three
secondary references did teach hyperspectral imaging for scanning earthbound features such
as mineral and vegetation deposits and for oceanographic and agricultural applications. The
Examiner had deemed such earth-bound targets as corresponding to the “targets” in the claims.34
The claims themselves did not define what comprised “targets,” and in reversing the rejection, the
panel also did not specifically define what comprised a “target.” Rather, the panel determined
that, reviewing the cited references, one skilled in the art would not have been motivated to
combine the teachings in the manner proposed by the Examiner:
First of all, there is no mention in any of the three secondary references of
utilizing hyperspectral imaging for a missile firing system. Cutts teaches utilizing
hyperspectral imaging from a vehicle in space to scan the earth . . . for the
purpose of identifying mineral or vegetative types. . . . While the appellants have
acknowledged that the system disclosed in Davies would be “suitable for use”
in the claimed missile system . . . , the reference does not mention such use,
suggesting only that the system be used in “earth monitoring satellites” . . . such
as oceanography, mapping and mineral exportation, for example. . . . The only
uses suggested in the Lurie reference are in space borne cameras that monitor
environmental and agricultural situations. . . . Second, the claims before us on
appeal all require that the system detect, track and guide a missile based upon
the “predetermined hyperspectral signature of a target of interest” which, as we
understand the teachings of the applied references, is not the manner in which
these systems operate. Third, none of the applied references recognize the
problems to which the appellants’ invention are directed, namely, providing a target
tracking system for missiles that provides a high degree of recognition and is
immune to countermeasures.35
The decision in Ex parte Nella has obvious benefits to the Applicant since it does not resort to any
definition of what comprises a “target.”36
{24} As a second example, in Ex parte Abbott, the claim recited a structure for a corrosion
resistant lead frame for an integrated circuit which included, inter alia, “an isolation layer
disposed upon said base metal layer and having a second standard reduction potential, said
second standard reduction potential being greater than said first standard reduction potential….”37
{25} In the decision, the Board noted that the Applicant’s specification provided an example of
the isolation layer as comprising of a palladium/nickel alloy layer.38 However, in reversing the
rejection, the isolation layer was not specifically defined by reference to such materials.39 Rather,
the panel stated more generally, “the problems to be solved and/or the solutions to the problems
in the Levine patents are different from that of the present invention.”40 In addition, in reversing
the prior art rejection, the decision further explains,
Since [the cited art] is concerned with a different problem relative to the claimed
invention and thus a different solution, we agree with the appellant that the
combined teachings of the admitted prior art and Levine ‘067 cannot render the
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subject matter of the appealed claims to be unpatentable within the meaning of 35
U.S.C. § 103.41
{26} The case law is replete with several general concepts that permit Examiner’s to apply and
combine references. First, references need not be directed to the same problem as an invention
in order to render a claim unpatentable.42 Second, the references themselves need not expressly
teach each and every claim feature to provide motivation for a modification.43 Third, the intended
use of a particular element does not confer patentability.44 Lastly, to comprise analogous art,
a reference need not be pertinent to every problem with which the Applicant is involved.45 This
case law liberates the Examiner to apply and combine prior art that may seem unrelated to the
invention at hand. The wide swath of available art and the rationale for combination of art limits
the amount of ground that the Applicant can truly claim as new and unobvious. Therefore, there
appears to be a great legal hurdle against making a successful argument that the Applicant
discovered a new problem and solution. Nevertheless, if at all feasible, arguments on appeal
should address the Applicant’s discovery of a solution to a new problem, since the benefits are so
numerous. The primary benefit is that the claim may be passed to issuance without the Board
making any pronouncements in the file history on the definition of any claim term. In addition,
there will be a pronouncement in the file history that the Applicant was the first to identify a
problem and solution. This is a strong factual component that would favor conferring “pioneer”
status on the patent and a greater scope of equivalents.46
{27} As a corollary, while the above two examples in Nella and Abbott pertain to an effect
achieved by the invention over the cited art, it is important to note that the effect is actually
described by the claim language. In Nella, the claim actually described guiding a missile
according to a “flight path” of the target.47 Therefore, the conceptual difference between the
claimed “target” and the earthbound targets in the references was fairly recited in the claims.
Similarly, in Abbot, the relative “standard reduction potential” of the isolation layer was also
described by the claims themselves, such that conceptually the claims were distinguishable
over the prior art.48 In contrast to the above examples, panels also consistently affirm rejections
where the Applicant argued that the invention achieved a particular effect over the prior art.
However, in those cases where the rejection was affirmed, the claims were silent as to the
purported improved effect.49
3. Semantic Distinctions Based On Definitions
{28} Additionally, following the widespread use of dictionaries in claim construction exercises
by the Federal Circuit,50 the Board of Patent Appeals also turns to dictionary definitions in
determining whether rejections are sustainable. In Ex parte Abe, 1997-2212, the claim included
a “second step for decompiling the machine program, thereby producing a second high-level
language source program which does not depend on any architecture.…” The panel recognized
that neither the specification nor the file history defined the term “decompiling” but instead
relied upon a technical dictionary to ascertain the scope of the claim. In so doing, the Board
determined that the cited art did not include a step for decompiling, which was independent of
a particular architecture, but in fact provided an opposite step of recompiling a program into an
architecture dependent form. Accordingly, the Board reversed the pending rejections.51
{29} In similar manner, in Ex parte Goumaz the panel referred to a technical dictionary to
determine the meaning of the claim term “charge amplifier.”52 There, the Board determined
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that amplification required a component to increase the strength of a signal without appreciably
altering its characteristic waveform. During ex parte prosecution, the Examiner had continually
relied upon a storage capacitor as corresponding to the claimed charge amplifier. The Board
noted that the passive capacitor cited by the Examiner could not correspond to the claimed
amplifier.53
{30} Of course, the Board’s use of dictionaries can also have the opposite effect and lead the
panel to affirm a rejection. In Ex parte Aboaf, a claim recited a type of recording head, and
the outcome of the appeal turned on the proper construction of the term “modules” appearing
in the claim. The panel determined that “module” is a broad and non-specific term, generally
defined with respect to electronic apparatus as a “packaged functional assembly of electronic
components for use with other such assemblies.”54 The panel noted that the specification
referred to a particular arrangement of read and write heads to make up “modules” but that the
claims were not so limited. The non-specificity of the term “module” was also used throughout
the cited art to identify different groupings of elements, other than those specifically identified by
the Applicant. Therefore, the rejection was affirmed in part because no distinction could be made
based on the general term “module.”55
{31} In the decisions discussed above, the Examiner seasonably challenged any construction
argued by the Applicant during the course of prosecution. In an instance where the Examiner
offers no construction broader than that offered by the Applicant, this should be pointed out in
the Appeal Brief.56 In the Abdelmonem appeal, the panel acknowledged that the claim recitation
at issue was very broad and subject to varying interpretations.57 However, the Examiner never
indicated that the claim step was being interpreted in making the rejections in a different way
from that set forth by the Applicant. Therefore, the Applicant’s interpretation prevailed, without
the panel relying on embodiments in the specification for claim interpretation purposes.58
{32} A final note on the use of dictionaries during appeal proceedings: the Board has been known
to use a dictionary to define a term used in a cited reference to determine whether an appealed
claim reads on the applied art.59
{33} In view of the foregoing, an Applicant who relies on the definitional aspects of certain
claim terms as a basis for distinguishing rejected claims from cited art would be well advised
to consider (1) whether the Examiner has considered a broader definitional construction that
is supportable; (2) whether the context of the claim recitation supports the advocated reading;
(3) whether the plain meaning in either a common dictionary or a technical dictionary results
in a broader construction that would make the rejected claim readable on the applied art; and
(4) whether a term used in a cited reference, while different from the Applicant’s terminology,
nonetheless can be construed to have the same meaning under either a common or a technical
dictionary definition.
4. Claim Interpretation for Section 112 Rejections
{34} In decisions rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, various panels have relied on the
specification provision of the second paragraph60 to determine whether the Applicant has claimed
the invention with sufficient clarity.61 Federal Circuit precedent clearly directs that construction
of the claim for purposes of clarity is charged to the examination process. “An essential purpose
of patent examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct and unambiguous.
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Fall 2003- Volume X, Issue 1

SUSAN PERNG PAN- APPEALING A REFECTION AT THE PATENT BOARD OF APPEALS

Only in this way can uncertainties of claim scope be removed, as much as possible, during the
administrative process.”62 Under § 112, second paragraph, the test for indefiniteness is “whether
the claim language, when read by a person of ordinary skill in the art in light of the specification,
describes the subject matter with sufficient precision that the bounds of the claimed subject
matter are distinct.”63
{35} Despite the liberal use of the specification provision in determining claim precision, many
rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, are affirmed. In the Ohira and Babel appeal
decisions, the panel had to determine whether the modifiers “substantial” and “substantially”
rendered the claims indefinite. In each instance, the panel determined that the claims were
indeed indefinite for including these modifiers.64 The result is somewhat surprising because the
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) expressly permits latitude in the use of relative
terminology in claim language, including the use of the term “substantially.”65 It is noted that
both in Ohira and in Babel, the panel found that the specifications gave no particular definition
of what comprised a “substantial” amount of the characteristic in question.66 Therefore, unlike
the cases discussed in the MPEP, the specifications did little to inform one skilled in the art of the
precise nature of the claim scope.
{36} As an additional claim construction exercise for purposes of § 112, second paragraph, the
Board may also consider whether the terminology in question has a particular meaning to one
skilled in the art by examining prior art references. In Ex parte Takaku, the Appellant presented
prior art not relied upon by the Examiner to demonstrate that the physical characteristics of
transparency would be understood by one skilled in the art of chemical vapor deposition.67
5. Legal Arguments
{37} The above discussions relate primarily to technical assessments based on the teachings of
the prior art in comparison with appealed claims. The second major category of argument is
the legal argument. Legal arguments redirect the emphasis towards the Examiner’s improper
application of references as set forth in the MPEP §§ 2112 and 2141-2144. Focusing a response
and appeal on the weaknesses in the Examiner’s rationale, rather than on the actual technical
teachings, forces the Examiner to reveal more of his thought processes. This will help the
Applicant understand the Examiner’s arguments, identify the weaknesses of their claims, and
shore up any such weaknesses prior to appeal. Focusing on the Examiner’s rationale during
ex parte prosecution also has the benefit of avoiding the inadvertent limiting of claims based
on express representation of what the claimed invention “is” and “is not” in comparison to the
applied art. This reduces the impact of file history estoppel in the case.
a. Lack of Inherency in Cited Art
{38} A review of sample cases suggests that contemporary panels are not inclined to rely on
purported implicit teachings in a reference to affirm a rejection. The hesitancy to find inherent
disclosures in prior art references applies to both (1) claimed structural features and (2) claimed
resultant effects. The structural features include, for example, attributes of shape of a particular
element,68 the ratios of dimensions for deciding placement of claim elements,69 the carbon
bonding in a chemical structure,70 and the presence of close-boiling of non-aromatics.71
Claimed effects include whether a rubber material is suitable for use as an “eraser,”72 whether a
component is operable in a “push on, pull off” fashion,73 and whether a hanger is rotatable about
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a post.74
{39} It is noteworthy that the cases that reverse rejections based on inherency appear generally
to be of more recent vintage. The concept of the lack of inherency argument is not a new one.75
However, the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Robertson appears to have given new strength to
this legal argument.76 To establish inherency, the extrinsic evidence
[M]ust make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the
thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons
of ordinary skill. . . . Inherency, however, may not be established by probabilities
or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of
circumstances is not sufficient.77
In view of the prevalence of reversals of rejections on grounds of lack of inherency of claim
elements in applied art, the record should be carefully developed with regard to any viable
inherency positions.
b. Motivation to Combine
{41} The argument for teaching away from particular combinations of references has proven
to be a common basis for reversing rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103.78 In Ex parte A. Said el
Shami, the claim for a diagnostic device for biological samples recited, in relevant part, “a specific
antibody binder covalently immobilized on said first solid phase support to which an analyte label
is prereacted to saturate substantially all binding sites on said binder to form a first solid phase
specific antibody binderanalyte label complex . . . .”79 The Board noted that the cited art was not
drawn to antibody-analyte complexes and to the extent that any analogies could be drawn, it was
clear that the target DNA in the reference did not become saturated as claimed.80 The saturation
of all the binding states in the disclosed probe would disable the DNA hybridization, which was
the desired result in the reference. An additional secondary reference also included a similar
deficiency since saturation of the binding sites would cause the binding sites to become occupied
when the reference relied on site availability for the disclosed device to operate.81 It is not obvious
that modifying a prior art device would lead to an inoperative construction.82
{42} The Examiner’s motivation for combining references can also be undermined by focusing on
the effects of the cited art. In Ex parte Palulu, the Examiner contended that the positioning of
certain operating switches onto the steering wheel of the vehicle would obviously minimize driver
distraction from the road.83 However, the cited reference was operable only when the vehicle is
at a stop, in an idling state or in a park position. Accordingly, there is no concern for the driver’s
distraction as the Examiner had postulated. The Panel subsequently reversed the rejection.84
{43} Strongly contesting the propriety of combining references either under the principle that the
references teach away from their combination, or that the modification or combination would
render one reference inoperable for its intended purpose is valuable since, as discussed above,
it would focus the analysis away from particular definitions in the claim language. Moreover, in
the event that it appears that the combination of art does conceptually teach each feature of the
claim, then lack of motivation remains an option to traverse the rejection.
IV. OPTIONS TO PURSUE IF APPEAL IS NOT PURSUED
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{44} As a general rule, ex parte prosecution should be exhausted up through receipt of the
Advisory Action after the Applicant responds to a final rejection. A constructive dialog between
the Applicant and the Examiner may lead to an earlier issuance of the patent, while providing
rigorous examination of the application. The latter has the benefit of bolstering the strength of the
patent upon issuance.
{45} If after a final rejection, the Applicant receives an Advisory Action indicating that the
arguments of record have not been deemed persuasive for all of the claims, the Applicant still
has several non-appeal options. A notice of appeal may be filed for reasons other than seeking
review of a rejection by the Board. For example, because filing a Notice of Appeal automatically
provides a two-month period for filing the brief, many Applicants routinely file a notice of appeal
as a cheaper alternative to seeking a third month extension of time to respond to a final rejection
under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). 85 Under these circumstances, and with the consent of the Examiner,
prosecution may proceed after filing a notice of appeal.
A. Amendment of Claims
{46} Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.116, final rejection amendments that cancel claims complying with any
requirement of form may be made of right, and amendments for rejected claims to place claims
in better form for consideration on appeal may be admitted at the discretion of the Examiner.86
B. Amendment To Obtain Allowance Of Claims Coupled With Continuation For Rejected Claims
{47} In the case that some claims stand rejected and some claims are allowable, a recommended
course would be to amend the allowable subject matter into condition for allowance in the subject
application. To avoid or mitigate the effects of estoppel, the Applicant may file a continuation
application for the rejected subject matter. The decision in Haynes International, Inc. v. Jessop
Steel Co.87 demonstrates the benefits of pursuing cancelled subject matter in a continuation case.
In Haynes, the Applicant was successful in obtaining reversal of rejections of certain claims in a
parent application during appeal but unsuccessful in reversing the rejection of another claim, and
therefore rewrote subject matter to obtain allowance of the allowed claims.88 The Board canceled
the rejected claim from the parent case.89 The Applicant indicated that they could conceivably
garner additional technical evidence in support of the patentability of the rejected claim and
subsequently filed a continuation application.90 However, the Applicant did not refile the rejected
claim that was previously before the Board and further did not submit any new evidence for
patentability in the continuation.91
[C]ancellation of these claims [in the parent] did not conclusively establish
that Cabot wanted to relinquish coverage of the subject matter encompassed
by them, and thus did not necessarily create an estoppel. It is only when the
cancellation is considered along with [Applicant’s] failure to refile these claims and
submit additional test data to support them, can it be said that an estoppel was
conclusively established.92
{48} Haynes suggests that a different case would be presented had the cancellation of rejected
claims occurred while prosecution was on-going. Had that been the case, the Applicant’s purpose
in canceling the claims could be inferred from that act as a relinquishment of subject matter.
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Fall 2003- Volume X, Issue 1

SUSAN PERNG PAN- APPEALING A REFECTION AT THE PATENT BOARD OF APPEALS

Haynes also creates a negative inference in not pursuing cancelled subject matter from a parent
case in a continuation.
C. Amendment of Non-Allowed Claims
{49} The Examiner has discretion to enter an amendment placing a case in condition for
allowance at any time prior to forwarding the Examiner’s answer on appeal. However, unless
the amendment requires only a cursory review by the Examiner, the appellant ordinarily will be
expected to comply with 37 C.F.R. § 1.116(c), by showing “good and sufficient reasons why they
are necessary and were not earlier presented.”93
{50} As a practical matter, the Examiner will probably refuse entry of any claim amendment
that was not deemed to place the entire application in condition for allowance. However, if the
Applicant determines that an amendment may persuade the Examiner of patentability, then
submission of the amendment would not prejudice the Applicant’s position during the course of
appeal. Non-entered claim amendments will not be interpreted by the Board as an indication
that an Applicant is acquiescing in a rejection. An Applicant is not estopped from changing his
strategy during the course of good faith prosecution before the Examiner. A willingness to amend
the claims does not prevent appellants from challenging a rejection.
D. Submission of Additional Evidence
{51} The decision whether to admit additional evidence submitted after final rejection is within the
discretion of the Examiner, unless prosecution is continued under one of the provisions discussed
in Section E, below. Unless the additional evidence is submitted in response to a suggestion from
the Examiner, or is submitted in conjunction with a convincing argument presented in response
to the final rejection and clearly places the application in condition for allowance, the Examiner
is likely to conclude that the new evidence or argument for patentability introduces new issues or
requires further substantive consideration, and will not enter the new evidence.94
E. Continued Prosecution in Lieu of Appeal
1. Request For Continued Examination After Final Rejection: RCE
{52} For applications filed after June 8, 1995, the Applicant may request further prosecution
on the merits and entry of any un-entered amendments filed under 37 C.F.R. § 1.116.95 Such a
filing withdraws the finality of the Office Action and any submissions will be considered on the
merits. In addition to modifications to the specification and claims, with the filing of the RCE the
prosecution can include submission of affidavit evidence and IDS materials.96 The submission
may be made after the appeal process commences but must be made prior to a decision on
appeal. In this circumstance, the application will be treated as being withdrawn from appeal for
prosecution before the Examiner.97
2. Continuation Practice
{53} For any application, the Applicant may also file a continuation or continuation-in-part
application to define the invention and claims more particularly.98
3. Transitional Practice
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{54} For older cases that have been pending for at least two years as of June 8, 1995, the
application is subject to the transitional provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 1.129(a). 99 Upon payment of
the fee under 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(r) the Applicant or appellant is entitled to consideration of the new
amendment, evidence, or submission denied entry by the Examiner after final rejection. This
submission must be made prior to filing a Brief on Appeal. It is most important to appreciate that
by filing an appeal brief under the GATT amendments, an appellant waives the right to continued
examination of claims finally rejected in the same application under 37 C.F.R. § 1.129(a). Filing
an appeal brief therefore terminates the right to a seventeen-year term in an older application, if
it is necessary to file a regular continuing application after the appeal. Any such application will
be restricted to a term that expires twenty years from the date of filing the first national benefit
application.
V. CONCLUSION
{55} Even though the patent statute permits appeal prior to final rejection of the claims, an
Applicant should take the opportunity to develop discourse with the Examiner to develop
arguments and a more detailed understanding of the Examiner’s rationale. Successful
prosecution before the Examiner will likely lead to earlier issuance of the patent because the
lengthy appeal process can be avoided. Throughout ex parte prosecution, the Applicant should
continually evaluate and strengthen his position in terms of technical arguments based on both
concepts and semantics in addition to legal arguments. If it is determined that the claims are not
in the best possible condition for appeal, several options are available to continue prosecution
before the Examiner.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
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